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The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law
and Its Repercussions for Swiss Federal Policy
For all its notoriety and controversial character, the history of
Swiss banking secrecy remains largely unexplored. This arti-
cle traces the crucial phases of its development. It reveals
that the maintenance and reinforcement of banking secrecy
represented a major objective of Swiss authorities throughout
the twentieth century, and exerted a substantial influence on
Swiss domestic and foreign policy. It demonstrates that, con-
trary to popular opinion, the institution of Swiss banking
secrecy did not arise from a desire to protect the funds
deposited in Switzerland by Jewish victims of Nazi persecu-
tion but rather had substantially different origins. Moreover,
this article shows that Swiss banking secrecy gave rise to ten-
sions between Switzerland and the Great Powers, especially
during and after World War II, when it poisoned relations
between Switzerland and the United States.
The recent controversy over how Swiss bankers handled the bankaccounts of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution has revealed, once
again, the degree to which the practice of Swiss banking secrecy re-
mains the subject of widespread, impassioned conflicts and debates.
My principal thesis in this article is that, throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, the maintenance or even reinforcement of banking secrecy repre-
sented a major objective of Swiss authorities, one that exerted a sub-
stantial influence on Swiss domestic and foreign policy and on Swiss
relations with other countries. Moreover, as I will show through an
analysis of Switzerland's banking policy before World War II and im-
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mediately after, the Swiss authorities have shown a consistency in their
policies over the years.
Despite the numerous controversies, Swiss banking secrecy has
not been the subject of in-depth historical research. In particular, the
existing studies do not analyze banking secrecy as a strategy that is con-
sistent with the peculiar conditions of the Swiss financial center and,
moreover, one that was devised to favor the conditions for its expan-
sion. True, there exists an abundant literature on the topic, but it com-
prises legal works, on the one hand, and journalistic studies, on the
other. Studies of the first type present a legal analysis of banking se-
crecy but dedicate no more than one or two pages to either the birth
and evolution of the practice or its role in determining federal policy.'
Nevertheless, a few of these works allot more space to the history of
banking secrecy, namely, the studies by Richard Zondervan, Le secret
bancaire suisse et sa legende (1973), and Maurice Aubert, Le secret ban-
caire suisse (1995). As for journalistic works, their focus is on uncover-
ing the story's sensational aspects rather than on presenting a logical
historical analysis, and they are not well documented.2 However, some
of these works supply the reader with useful information. For instance,
Nicholas Faith's book, Safety in Numbers (1982), reports on several in-
teresting episodes in the twentieth-century saga of banking secrecy.
Another work, by Tom Bower, entitled Blood Money (1997), covers the
Swiss banks' role in World War II. In brief, all these analyses are frag-
mentary, so that, even today, the history of the Swiss Banking Secrecy
Law is almost entirely misunderstood.
1
 The principal works in this category are the following: Paul Lavanchy, Das Bankgeheim-
nis in der schweizerischen Gesetzgebung mit besonderer Berucksichtigung des Steuerrechts
(Zurich, 1935); Georges Capitaine, Le secret professionnel du banquier en droit suisse et en
droit compare (Geneve, 1936); Adolf Jann, Der Umfang und die Grenzen des Bankgeheimnis-
ses nach schweizerischem Recht (Altdorf, 1938); Francois Delachaux, Le secret professionnel
du banquier en droit suisse (Neuchatel, 1939); Richard Zondervan, Le secret bancaire suisse
et sa legende. Une appreciation critique (Bruxelles, 1973); Le secret bancaire dans la C.E.E.
et en Suisse (Paris, 1974); Raymond Farhat, Le secret bancaire. Etude de droit compare
(France, Suisse, Liban) (Paris, 1980); Maurice Aubert et al., Le secret bancaire suisse. Droit
prive, penal, administratif, fiscal, procedure, entraide et conventions intemationales (Bern,
1995); Stephan M. Pieper, Rechts- und Amtshilfe in Steuerangelegenheiten durch die Schweiz
insbesondere im Hinblick aufdas schweizerische Bankgeheimnis (Frankfurt, 1995).
2
 Cf, for example, Theodore Reed Fehrenbach, The Swiss Banks (New York, 1966);
Leslie Waller, The Swiss Bank Connection (New York, 1972); Thurston Clarke and John J.
Tigue, Jr., Dirty Money: Swiss Banks, the Mafia, Money Laundering, and White Collar Crime
(London, 1975); Christoph Biichenbacher, Tatsachen iiher dm schweizerische Bankgeheim-
nis (Zurich, 1977); Nicholas Faith, Safety in Numbers: The Mysterious World of Swiss Bank-
ing (London, 1982); Jean Saunier, Le pouvoir des banques suisses (Paris, 1982); Tom Bower,
Blood Money: The Swiss, the Nazis and the Looted Billions (London, 1997); Adam LeBor,
Hitler's Secret Bankers: Hole Switzerland Profited from Nazi Genocide (London, 1997).
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3116693
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:18:57, subject to the
The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law I 239
No work adequately examines the origins of the Secrecy Law. In
fact, for many years, one or two particularly persistent legends have cir-
culated concerning this topic. Since the late 1960s, the most widely dis-
seminated story asserts that the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law was intro-
duced in 1934, with the adoption of the Federal Banking Law, and that
it was a measure designed to protect the victims—mainly Jewish—of
Nazi persecution. Perhaps the most striking summary of this version,
written by Philippe de Week, former president of the Union Bank of
Switzerland, can be found in a reference work, Nouveau manuel de la
politique exterieure suisse (New Manual of Swiss Foreign Policy), pub-
lished in 1992. Having called the readers attention to "the Nazi perse-
cution of Jewish German citizens which provoked an influx of the vic-
tims' capital" to Switzerland, de Week continues:
. . . it was because of this influx of capital belonging to the victims of
persecution that the famous Banking Secrecy Law was introduced
into Swiss legislation. Emissaries of Nazi organizations actually fol-
lowed the immigrants to Switzerland. They endeavored to obtain
information concerning the capital they held in Switzerland. Once
in possession of such information, they would have been in a posi-
tion to blackmail members of their families still in Germany. It was
in order to prevent such information from coming into the posses-
sion of Nazi emissaries that a particularly stringent Banking
Secrecy Law was introduced into Swiss legislation at that time. It
was a courageous act at a time when Germany, so close to Switzer-
land, was so powerful. From this point of view, Switzerland played
an international financial role at that moment in history which
came close to [being] an humanitarian action towards a category of
people whose terrible misfortune is also part of history.3
This version is still widely accepted even today, notably in foreign
publications. In February 1996, for example, the Economist wrote:
"Many Swiss are proud of their Banking Secrecy Law, because it has
admirable origins (it was passed in the 1930s to help persecuted Jews
protect their savings)."4 A book published in 1997, albeit critical of the
attitude of Swiss banks during the Nazi period, affirms the point:
"Banking Secrecy . . . was introduced in 1934—in part to protect Jews
who deposited money in Swiss banks."5
3
 Philippe de Week, "Le role de la Suisse comme place financiere internationale," in A.
Riklin et al., eds., Nouveau manuel de la politique exterieure suisse (Bern, 1992), 878. This
and all subsequent translations in this article are mine, unless indicated otherwise.
* The Economist, 17 Feb. 1996, 78.
5
 A. LeBor, Hitlers Secret Bankers, 3.
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This version does not correspond with the facts. In the first place,
the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law was not introduced in 1934 but was
merely reinforced at that time. Second, and more important, in the
present state of research it has by no means been established that Swiss
ruling circles—by this term, we refer to the government circles and main
employers' associations—adopted this measure for humanitarian reasons,
namely, with the intention of protecting Jews from Nazi persecution.
A final point: In the last five years, the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law
has been even more severely questioned on the international scene be-
cause of the way Swiss bankers have handled the accounts of victims of
the Nazis since the end of World War II. However, I will not deal here
with this aspect of banking secrecy. There are some interesting studies
on this topic, notably that of Peter Hug and Marc Perrenoud, In der
Schweiz liegende Vermogenswerte von Nazi-Opfern und Entschadi-
gungsabkommen mit Oststaaten (Assets of Nazi Victims in Switzerland
and Compensation Agreements with Eastern States).6
Swiss Banking Secrecy Law Prior to 1934
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the practice of secrecy has
been deeply rooted in Swiss banking activity. At the time, this practice
was based on tradition rather than on a concrete law or set of laws. Sev-
eral laws existed that could be used as a legal basis for the practice of
banking secrecy. However, these were either adopted only in a few can-
tons (the Swiss federal state is made up of twenty-two cantons that are
the equivalent of the U.S. states), where they affected only the public
banks, or, in the case of federal laws, bore an extremely unclear relation
to banking secrecy. What was clear, however, was that banking secrecy
was a matter of civil, not criminal, law. Consequently, its violation re-
sulted in civil, but not penal, proceedings. In other words, sanctions
could be imposed only if a claim had been lodged by the injured party,
and in the form of damages. This limitation did not prevent banking se-
crecy from being widely practiced. In particular, Swiss authorities found
it difficult to penetrate banking secrecy in pursuit of fiscal objectives.
Thus, although banking secrecy was already established in Swiss
banking and political mores at the turn of the century, its importance
6
 On this topic, cf. Swiss Federal Archives, Flight Funds, Looted Profierty and Dormant
Assets: Status of Research and its Perspectives (Bern, 1997); Peter Hug and Marc Perrenoud,
In der Schweiz liegende Vermogenswerte von Nazi-Opfern und Entschadigungsabkomrnen
mit Oststaaten (Bern, 1997); Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (ICEP), Report
on Dormant Accounts of Victims of Nazi Persecution in Swiss Banks (Bern, 1999).
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began to grow at that time. Indeed, in several European countries, this
period witnessed increased taxation of the wealthy propertied classes.
In France, for example, the government greatly increased the inherit-
ance tax in 1901 and, during the following years, it began to prepare for
the introduction of an income tax on high revenues.
Lacking comparable industrial and commercial power, Swiss banks
could in no way compete with financial centers such as London, Paris,
or Berlin. However, members of the Swiss banking circles soon real-
ized that the tax increases occurring in several countries offered them
an interesting possibility: that of attracting to Switzerland foreign capi-
tal seeking to evade domestic taxation considered to be exorbitant.
In this context, the importance of banking secrecy, as it was hith-
erto adopted and practiced in Switzerland, took on a new dimension.
For those in Swiss business circles, banking secrecy was no longer
simply an instrument with primarily internal functions that was de-
signed to protect them from the domestic tax authorities. It now also
became an instrument with external functions, a lynchpin in the strat-
egy of attracting foreign capital to Switzerland and hence a major asset
in international competition.
This explains why Swiss banking institutions initiated massive pro-
paganda campaigns in neighboring countries, extolling the advantages
of Switzerland as a tax haven. For example, in an advertising circular
distributed in France in October 1910, a major Swiss bank drew atten-
tion to the fact that the situation in Switzerland "enables us to manage
with the utmost discretion securities entrusted to our care by cus-
tomers from abroad."7 This propaganda campaign reached such a level
of intensity, even before World War I, that the Swiss minister of econ-
omy, fearful of possible retaliatory measures from foreign governments,
felt obliged to ask the bankers to lower the pitch of their message.8
World War I represented a turning point in the history of Swiss
finance. The world conflict introduced a long period characterized in
most European countries by a succession of political, financial, and
monetary crises, as well as by a massive increase in taxation. In these
conditions, foreign capital—especially French, German, Italian, and
Austrian—poured into Swiss banks on a scale hitherto unknown. De-
positors were attracted by the protection offered by the solidity of the
Swiss franc, by the political stability of the country, by its neutrality, by
' Circular quoted in Maurice Brion, L'exode des capitaux franQais a Vetranger (Paris,
1912), 24.
8Cf. H. Liithy and G. Kreis, eds., Documents diplomatiques suisses, v. 5 (Bern, 1983),
901.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3116693
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:18:57, subject to the
Sebastien Guex I 242
the mildness of its taxation laws, by the obliging nature of its fiscal au-
thorities, and, last but not least, by the existence of banking secrecy.
Thanks to the magnitude of the influx, Swiss banks enjoyed a spectacu-
lar takeoff. From that time on, an historian writes, "Switzerland be-
came transformed into an international financial center," a transforma-
tion sanctioned in 1930 by the establishment in Basel of the Bank for
International Settlements.9 It is important to point out that Switzerland
became an international financial center after World War I by occupy-
ing a specific position: that of "a turntable for international capital,"
that is, a place for the reception of assets coming from abroad, assets
that were in turn lent abroad again, but this time under the Swiss flag.10
In other words, the principal Swiss banks established their high-ranking
position in the world banking hierarchy mainly by through becoming a
refuge of choice for foreign capital.
These characteristics of the Swiss financial center multiplied ten-
fold the importance of the issue of banking secrecy. From World War I
onward, banking secrecy became a major—sometimes even the
main—stake in relations between Switzerland and a number of other
countries. Indeed, the authorities of several foreign countries did not
remain inactive when confronted with the massive exodus of interna-
tional capital to the Swiss haven. On several occasions, they actively
tried to stop it, especially in the years following the first World War.
For example, whereas the French and Belgian governments did not
appreciate their wealthy citizens' transferring assets to Switzerland and
thereby escaping taxation, they were even more incensed by the flight
of considerable German capital to the Swiss refuge, fearing that this
movement of funds might endanger payment of the reparations im-
posed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty.
From the end of the war, therefore, France and Belgium em-
barked on a series of relatively modest measures for prevailing on Swiss
authorities and financial institutions to limit the practice of banking se-
crecy. Their goal was to obtain precise information on the identity of
certain capital holders, in the hope of being able to exercise pressure
on them—or even to take legal action against them—and thereby indi-
rectly discourage the flight of assets to Switzerland.
Swiss ruling circles doggedly, and successfully, refused to make any
concession regarding these requests for access, even though, as the
9
 Hugo Banziger, Die Enttvicklung der Bankenaufsicht in der Schweiz seit dem 19. Jahr-
hundert (Bern, 1986), 57.
10
 Ren6 Chopard, "La banque suisse face au defi europeen," Annales de la Faculte de
droit et de science politique de I'Universite de Clermnnd-Ferrand (1989), 246.
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Federal Council stated during one of its sessions, "in several coun-
tries . . . there will be deep resentment against Switzerland because of
this attitude."11 The Swiss government left little doubt about the rea-
sons for this policy of obstruction. Any agreement to identify even a
few owners of the foreign assets entrusted to the care of Swiss banking
establishments, the government explained at the same session, would
force it to "go to the length of suspending banking secrecy and forcing
the banks to provide information. . . . The importance of banking activ-
ity to the Swiss economy calls for the greatest prudence as far as mea-
sures against tax evasion are concerned. This is why the Committee of
the Swiss Bankers' Association has likewise decided strictly to reject. . .
any measure combating this evasion."12
The Origins of the Reinforcement
of Banking Secrecy in 1934
Beginning in the second half of 1931, and during the years imme-
diately following, Switzerland experienced the worst banking crisis in
its history. Of the eight major banks of that time, one went bankrupt,
another survived only because it received massive help from the fed-
eral state, and four had to be substantially reorganized.13 In addition,
from the summer of 1931 onward, the issue of the elaboration of a fed-
eral banking law by the Swiss Confederation became a matter of in-
creasing urgency. Not only the workers' movement, headed by the So-
cialist Party, but also wide sectors of the farmers, represented by
the powerful Swiss Farmers' Union (Union suisse des Paysans), and
the middle classes clamored for more control over the financial sector.
Their main demands were, on the one hand, for the State to introduce
some control over banking activities, especially in order to protect the
savings of the lower and middle classes. On the other hand, while
fighting for lower interest rates, they asked for tighter control of capital
export in order to combat the increase in interest rates resulting from
growing amounts of capital being invested abroad.
Even though the government had remained hesitant, not to say
11
 Minutes of the Federal Council's meeting of 21 March 1924, Federal Archives, Bern
[henceforth FAB], E 1004.1.
12
 Ibid.
13
 Cf. Paul Ehrsam, "Die Bankenkrise der 30er Jahre in der Schweiz," in Commission
federate des banques, ed., Cinquante ans de surveillance federate des banques (Zurich, 1985),
83-118; Patrick Halbeisen, "Bankenkrise und Bankengesetzgebung in den 30er Jahren," in S.
Guex et al., eds., Krisen und Stabilisierung. Die Schweiz in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Zurich,
1998), 63-68.
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reticent, for a long time, it finally relented under the combined
influence of this pressure and the mounting difficulties faced by finan-
cial establishments. Also, the severe worldwide banking crisis provoked
intensified state regulation of banking activities in many countries.14 In
January 1933, the Federal Council decided to formulate a banking law.
A first draft, outlined in February 1933, already included—significantly
enough—an article on banking secrecy.15 This bill underwent numer-
ous changes during the phases of preparliamentary and parliamentary
debates following its introduction, but it finally passed into law. On the
other hand, it is important to note that, during this entire period, the
article dealing with banking secrecy occasioned no debate, nor was it
modified to any notable degree. In other words, the future article 47 of
the Banking Law voted by the Swiss Parliament in November 1934 re-
mained practically identical, in substance if not in form, to the corre-
sponding article of the February 1933 draft.
Article 47 of the Banking Law made the violation of banking se-
crecy subject to criminal law and the possibility of both heavy fines and
up to six months' imprisonment. In principle, such violation had to be
automatically prosecuted by the legal authorities, even if the injured
party did not sue. The adoption of the 1934 law thus represented a
considerable reinforcement of banking secrecy and was the first time
that this practice obtained a clear basis in federal law. It was no longer
subject to civil law alone, but to criminal law. By recognizing that the
safeguarding of banking secrecy was in the public interest, the state in
a certain sense conferred on this secrecy law the status of public weal.
With its adoption in 1934, Switzerland became, among economically
developed countries, the one with by far the most rigorously protected
banking secrecy law.
Introduction of the Concept of Supervision of the Banks
The introduction of an article on banking secrecy in the 1934 law
was a response primarily to fears arising in certain banking circles—
and more generally in business as a whole—that this law threatened to
establish a form of supervision of Swiss banks. Bankers feared that the
agents of this supervision, who would have access to the books and reg-
" Cf. Karl Erich Born, Geld und Banken im 19, und 20. jahrhundert {Stuttgart, 1977),
480-537,
15
 Cf. the two drafts entitled Bundesgesetz iiber die Beaufsichtigung der Banken und
Sparkassen, by Eduard Kellenberger, 17 and 24 Feb. 1933, FAB E 4110(A)/19/40 and
E 6520(A)/l/3; also H. Banziger, Die Entwicklung, 89-105.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3116693
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:18:57, subject to the
The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law I 245
isters of the banks, would leak information about their clients to
Swiss—or worse, to foreign—authorities. Such a risk seemed to them
even more acute if future investigations were to be directly carried out
by federal civil servants, inasmuch as insulation between the various
federal departments did not seem sufficiently watertight. Explaining
the attitude of banking circles at the time, a major banker later wrote
that they could not possibly accept "state inspection" if "they wished to
avoid the endangering of banking secrecy that this would imply."16
It is helpful to recall that this episode in the 1930s had a precedent.
At the beginning of 1914, in reaction to difficulties encountered by sev-
eral important financial establishments, the Swiss government had be-
gun to consider introducing a form of supervision of the banks and had
taken steps in this direction. Fearful that such oversight might weaken
the practice of banking secrecy, bankers, led by the National Bank and
the Swiss Bankers' Association, had expressed misgivings, if not out-
right rejection. This opposition, followed by the outbreak of World War I
and the consequent improvement of the banks' situation, caused the
matter to be quickly dropped.17
At the time that the question of bank supervision was reintroduced
in the summer of 1931, the opposition of businessmen had in no way
diminished. Accordingly, they made their agreement to such control
dependent on two absolute conditions: First, such regulation should
take the mildest form possible and should, under no circumstances, be
directly exercised by the State. Second, it must be accompanied by ar-
rangements designed to maintain banking secrecy.
As early as August 1931, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the highly influen-
tial journal of Swiss business circles, published an editorial violently at-
tacking the idea that supervision of the banks might be entrusted to
the Confederation. The editorial stressed the fact that regulation of the
banks must exclude any "possibility of having access to the financial sit-
uation" of the banks' customers, which, it warned, would provoke the
withdrawal of Swiss and foreign depositors.18 One week later, the Zur-
ich daily repeated its warning at greater length.19
In January 1932, the managing director of Credit Suisse, Adolf
Johr—a man who played a central role in the elaboration of the 1934
16
 Letter from the managing director of Credit Suisse to the head of the Federal Depart-
ment of Finance, 9 Feb. 1935, FAB, E 6520(A)/l/l.
17
 Cf. H. Banziger, Die Entwicklung, 38-49; and Sebastien Guex, La politique monetaire
etfinanciere de la Confederation suisse 1900-1920 (Lausanne, 1993), 217-219.
18
 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 28 Aug. 1931.
19
 Cf. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 3 and 4 Sept. 1931.
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Banking Law—tried to clarify the situation. Writing as a consultant to
the head of the federal Department of Finance, Jean-Marie Musy, Johr
argued that it was extremely important that "the strictest possible se-
crecy be preserved" and therefore he emphasized that the introduction
of such supervision must be accompanied by the adoption of legal mea-
sures punishing the violation of banking secrecy: "A matter which regu-
larly provokes reservations [in business circles] is the preservation of
absolute discretion during inspections conducted by authorities exter-
nal to the bank. . . . It is therefore essential to establish liabilities in the
law itself. It would be extremely desirable if indiscretions could be
punished at [the] penal level. . . ."20
In February 1932, a director of the Banque d'Escompte Suisse, an-
other of the eight leading Swiss banks, sent a series of propositions con-
cerning bank supervision to the head of the Department of Finance.
Among these, several were devised for "preserving strict discretion . . .
towards all political authorities .. ., especially towards fiscal organs and
offices . . . ," and they envisaged severe sanctions in case of violation of
this discretionary duty.21 Finally, in October 1932, a paper reflecting
the preoccupations of the Association of Cantonal Banks was sent to
the Department of Finance, likewise insisting on the need, in the event
of bank supervision being introduced, to "exercise extreme care to
maintain banking secrecy."22
Alerted by the precedent of 1914, the federal authorities this time
met the expectations of business circles immediately and without am-
biguity. From the start, the latter received solid assurances, including
the guarantee that bank oversight would not be conducted directly by the
State and that such supervision, far from weakening banking secrecy,
would actually strengthen it. In September 1931, the federal councilor,
J.-M. Musy, gave a speech on "the issue of bank supervision" before the
annual assembly of Swiss bankers, in which he declared: "Governmen-
tal bank supervision is desirable neither for the State, nor for the bank.
. . . The intervention of official investigators would alarm . . . cus-
tomers, who attach great importance to the preservation of discretion,
on which they want to be able to rely. The flight of capital deposited in
our banks that might result from the institution of official supervision
20
 Vorschlage zur Revision des Obligationenrechts hinsichtlich der Banken-Kontrolle, by
Adolf Johr, 24 Jan. 1932, FAB E 6520(A)/l/2.
21
 Draft B, Bundesgesetz iiber die schweizerische Bank- und Borsen-Zentrale, by Fritz
Zimmermann-Locher, 3 Feb. 1932, FAB, E 6520(A)/l/2.
22
 Verband Schweiz, Kantonalbanken, Auszug aus den Vortriigen des Herrn Jakob Kad-
erli, 27 Oct. 1932, FAB E 6520(A)/l/2.
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would cause our national economy great damage, from which the en-
tire population would suffer."23
A few days later, the head of the Department of Finance repeated
these guarantees before the Swiss Parliament. "One must be very care-
ful in the field" of bank supervision and not endanger the practice of
"banking secrecy," he declared, because "we must try and prevent
Swiss or foreign capital, which now works at a profit for our national
economy, from being induced to leave our country."24 In the same
month of September 1931, the president of the Confederation struck a
reassuring note. In an important public speech dealing with the "issue
of bank supervision," Heinrich Haberlin declared that "the open or co-
vert lifting of banking secrecy would be fatal" because it would only
provoke the flight of Swiss and foreign capital.2"5 The federal authorities
repeated similar assurances on several occasions throughout 1932.26
With such unity among bankers, it is easy to understand why an ar-
ticle enforcing banking secrecy was included in the first draft of the
Banking Law. It also clarifies why it not only provoked no criticism but
also led to no real debate during the preparliamentary and parliamen-
tary phases. From the point of view of business circles, it represented
the indispensable complement to the introduction of bank supervision.
Any contention of such an article would have multiplied tenfold the
risk of a veto from these circles and their representatives and so have
endangered the entire law. For this was specifically an outcome that
the Socialists, who favored the fastest possible implementation of the
supervision of banking activities, desired to avoid. This situation partly
explains the paradoxical absence of any reaction from those political
circles that were the main opponents of banking secrecy.27
Strong-Arm Tactics by France against the
Flight of Capital to Switzerland
A second cause for the reinforcement of banking secrecy was the
danger of external threats. Ever since 1930, the world economic crisis
had confronted many of Switzerland's neighboring states with grave
23
 Speech reported in Bulletin de la Societe de Banque Suisse, no 6, late Oct. 1931,
195.
-
J
 Bulletin stenographique offidel de I'Assemhlee federate—Conseil national, Bern, 25
Sept, 1931, 663.
25
 Speech reported by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 18 Sept. 1931.
26
 Cf. especially the Bulletin stenographique offidel de I'Assemhlee federale—Conseil na-
tional, Bern, 8 June 1932, 252.
27
 On this last aspect, cf. ibid., 27 Sept. 1932, 705.
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financial and monetary difficulties, sharpening internal political ten-
sions. As at the end of World War I, these states—mainly France and
Germany—were confronted with new and massive flights of capital to-
ward countries of refuge, most often to Switzerland. They again initi-
ated a series of measures designed to hinder this outflow.
Consequently, the Swiss federal authorities and the Swiss financial
market once more found themselves involved in a predicament similar
to the one that arose immediately after World War I. This time, how-
ever, the threat was perceived by other countries to be appreciably
more serious. Compared with the measures imposed previously, and
probably precisely because of their inefficacy, those adopted at the be-
ginning of the 1930s were noticeably more drastic.
Thus in Germany, from July 1931 onward, Chancellor Heinrich
Briining's government enacted a number of increasingly rigorous de-
crees designed to interrupt the flight of German capital abroad and, if
possible, even to induce the repatriation of funds already deposited in
foreign countries. One decree, for example, required that all assets in
foreign currency owned by German citizens be declared to the Reichs-
bank and, if requested by the latter, sold in exchange for Reichsmarks.28
In addition to these measures, the German authorities made various at-
tempts to conduct banking espionage in Switzerland during the follow-
ing years in order to obtain information from employees of Swiss banks
about their German customers.29
From the Swiss point of view, however, by far the most disturbing
steps were taken not by Germany but, as occurred after World War I,
by France, where a new center-left government, presided over by the
radical Edouard Herriot, had been appointed in June 1932. Faced with
grave budgetary difficulties, and in an effort to strengthen its wavering
popularity, this new government announced a range of measures di-
rected against the flight of capital and tax evasion. In this context, a
spectacular blow was delivered against Switzerland.30
On October 27, 1932, the Paris offices of one of the eight leading
Swiss banks of the period, Basler Handelsbank, were searched by the
French authorities and numerous documents were seized. The latter
revealed that Basler Handelsbank had been organizing transfers of
capital and tax evasion for the benefit of rich French clients for a long
28
 Cf. esp. Notverordnung gegen die Kapital- und Steuerflucht, 18 July 1931, Reichs-
gesetzblatt 1931, v. 1,373ff.
29
 Cf. Beat Balzli, Les achninistrateurs du Reich. La Suisse et la disparithm des biens des
victimes du nazisme (Geneve, 1997), 109—110; and H. Banziger, Die Entwicklung, 115-116.
30
 Cf. N. Faith, Safety in Numbers, 64-72, 81.
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time, in contravention of French law. During the succeeding days, fur-
ther search operations were carried out, implicating another leading
Swiss bank, the Banque d'Escompte Suisse, as well as a private bank in
Geneva.
The affair created an enormous sensation. Swiss and French news-
papers devoted long columns to the subject for several weeks, and, on
November 10, 1932, a stormy debate erupted in the French Parlia-
ment. Other countries were also affected by the scandal: in the same
month, for example, a leading German newspaper published a long ar-
ticle under the headline "French Attack on Swiss Banking Secrecy."31
Such reactions were hardly surprising. On the one hand, it soon
emerged that the amounts eluding French taxation were extremely
large. The figure most frequently mentioned at the time was 1 billion
French francs, or some 200 million Swiss francs. In fact, the amount
was probably at least twice as high (the equivalent of roughly 40 to 50
billion of todays French francs).32 In addition, the documents
confiscated during the requisitions enabled the authorities to establish
a list of persons involved that ran to over a thousand names. Some of
these names were published. Among them were numerous prominent
French figures: three senators, a dozen generals, two bishops, former
ministers, leading industrialists like the Peugeot family and the Coty
family, owners of the influential daily he Figaro.33
The seizures—constituting strong-arm tactics that were most un-
usual in this type of affair—were alone enough to worry the Swiss au-
thorities and business circles. The French authorities, however, did not
content themselves with firing this warning shot. Legal proceedings
were immediately started against the three Swiss banks, and their assets
in France—approximately 80 million French francs for the Basler
Handelsbank alone—were frozen. On November 10, 1932, after a long
and turbulent debate, the French Chamber of Deputies adopted a res-
olution requiring the government to take ". . .all effective measures to
prevent and repress fiscal fraud that has all too long been tolerated."34
During the debate, the minister of finance adopted an even more men-
acing stance, defining the governments aim as that of ". . . obtaining
the suppression of fiscal fraud, either by means of already existing texts
31
 Kolnische Zeitung, 22 Nov. 1932; cf. also the Viennese Neue Frefe Presse, 23 Nov. 1932;
and the Gz,ecl\ newspaper Bohemia, 14 D e c . 1932.
32
 Cf. Eduard Kellenberger, Kapitalexjmrt und Zahlungsbilanz, v. 2 (Bern, 1942), 81; and
he Petit Parisien 4 April 1935.
33
 Journal officiel, 11 Nov. 1932, 2998-2999, and he Matin, 24 Nov. 1932.
u
 Journal officiel, 11 Nov. 1932. 3004.
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or by new ones that will soon be submitted to you . . . , but also, gentle-
men, in certain cases in which a text seems impossible to formulate
and is above all ineffective, repression by all the means available to a
Government."35
Barely one week after this discussion, on November 16, 1932, two
members of the board of administration of the Basler Handelsbank
were summoned by the French authorities, who requested them to au-
thorize French officials to examine the bank's books on the Basel pre-
mises. The Swiss administrators' refusal led to the immediate impris-
onment of one manager and one assistant manager of the Basel
establishment, who had both been present at the October 27th requisi-
tion in Paris. Both were released only after spending two months in
custody. This measure was designed to increase pressure on the Basel
bank in order to force it to lift banking secrecy and allow free access to
its registers.36
On November 21, 1932, the French authorities presented a new
initiative, asking the Federal Council for judicial cooperation.37 In tan-
dem with this move, French authorities were resorting to the sort of
measures alluded to by the French minister of finance in his appear-
ance before the Chamber of Deputies. In a report, sent to the presi-
dent of the Confederation from Paris in December 1932, the Swiss
minister drew the attention of his superior to information that had
reached him about banking espionage practiced by "secret agents of
the French Government... in several Swiss towns" concerning "various
French clients of our banks," asking him to examine "the possibility of
taking measures to prevent these activities."38
From January 1933 onward, the situation began to quiet down,
mainly because the French government led by Herriot had been
forced to resign in mid-December of 1932. Nevertheless, the measures
directed against the Swiss banks, particularly against the Basler Han-
delsbank, were not finally settled until some twelve years later.
At the same time, the Swiss financial center and the Swiss Banking
Secrecy Law were defended with the utmost determination; the fed-
eral authorities refused to examine any claims, whatever they might be,
m
 Ibid., 3002.
36
 Cf. letter from the Basler Handelsbank to the Federal Political Department, 4 Jan.
1933, and its annexes, as well as the Memorandum of the Basler Handelsbank for the Federal
Political Department, 27 Oct. 1936, FAB E 2001(D)/l/64.
37
 Cf. letter from the Police Division of the Federal Department of Justice and Police to
the Federal Political Department, 14 Dec. 1932, FAB E 2001(D)/l/64.
38
 Letter from the Swiss ambassador in France to the president of the Confederation, 22
Dec. 1932, FAB E 2001 /D/l/64.
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3116693
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:18:57, subject to the
The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law I 251
emanating from France. They thus categorically rejected the French
request for judicial cooperation.
An internal document explained this attitude, emphasizing that
"from the Swiss point of view, it would in no way be in our interest to
grant French agents judicial cooperation which might have very unfa-
vorable repercussions on the substantial business accruing to our banks
from foreign deposits."39 Meanwhile, Swiss business circles and their
various representatives vigorously denounced the French measures as
a campaign aimed at weakening, even naming, the Swiss financial cen-
ter. At the end of November 1932, for instance, the Journal de Geneve,
which was close to Geneva banking circles, published an editorial en-
titled "The Offensive against Switzerland," which stated: "There is an
obvious attempt to sow anxiety, in particular to frighten French citizens
who have deposited their capital in Switzerland.... It is not just a mat-
ter of acceptable action against tax evasion . . . but a campaign against
Swiss finance as a whole."40 At the same time, the Finanz-Revue spoke
of "a fight by the French left-wing bloc directed against Swiss banking
secrecy."41 In December 1932 and January 1933, the Neue Zurcher Zei-
tung published a series of commentaries implying that a "veritable hate
campaign" was being waged against Swiss banks,42
In this context, financial circles repeatedly called for reinforcement
of the banking secrecy. On November 23, 1932, the Finanz-Revue ex-
pressed the hope that " . . . the campaign led by the French left-wing
bloc against Swiss banks" might lead to a state of "increased confidence
in Swiss banking secrecy."43 However, the most significant factor in this
connection was a long article published by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung
on January 10, 1933. This article was written by one of the managers of
the Banque d'Escompte Suisse—the same man who, a year earlier, had
sent the head of the Department of Finance a draft of the banking law
that already included a clause reinforcing banking secrecy. The author
emphasized the fact that banking secrecy " . . . constitutes an excellent
asset for the banks and the economy" of Switzerland and stated that
"one cannot conceive that Switzerland could maintain the strength of
its banks, which is in the interest of its economy as a whole . . . thanks
to the confidence that they inspire internationally, without the mainte-
38
 Letter from the Federal Political Department to the Swiss Embassy in Germany, 17
Nov. 1932; cf. also letter from the Federal Political Department to the Swiss Legation in
France, 12 Nov. 1932, FAB E 2001 (D)/l/64.
40
 Journal de Geneve, 26 Nov. 1932.
41
 Finanz-Revue, 23 Nov. 1932; see also 16 Nov. 1932.
42
 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 23 Dec. 1932; see also 4 and 21 Dec. 1932 aiid 10 Jan. 1933.
43
 Finanz-Revue, 23 Nov. 1932.
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nance of strict respect for and explicit legal protection of banking se-
crecy [einen positiven Schutz]."44 He went on to stress that up to now
this secrecy had been based exclusively on civil law. Referring implic-
itly to the measures being enacted by France, the author concluded
by expressing the hope that the federal state take upon itself directly
the task of protecting banking secrecy by giving the latter a basis in
public law:
Inasmuch as . . . it is not only the banks but also the Swiss econ-
omy in general that have a fundamental interest in maintaining
banking secrecy, this implies in a certain sense that the State
should assume legal responsibility for seeing this secrecy
respected. Recently our attention has several times been drawn to
this aspect in connection with various attempts at banking espio-
nage in Switzerland. Such attempts, ably and categorically
opposed by Swiss banks, clearly represent a menace to the econ-
omy and hence, ultimately, to the financial and economic inde-
pendence of the country.
It is worth recalling here that the first draft of the banking law
elaborated by the federal authorities dates from February 1933. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, with French threats just beginning to di-
minish, that the draft should have included a clause written to consoli-
date banking secrecy. For Swiss ruling circles, this was a matter of
sending out a clear message to foreign customers who felt insecure
after the procedures started by the French authorities, namely, that
Swiss banking secrecy would continue to be defended even more rigor-
ously in the future.
The Swiss also viewed it as a matter of safeguarding against a dan-
ger that the French affair had highlighted: that of seeing any bank, un-
der strong pressure from a powerful foreign government, itself take the
initiative in providing access to its books and thereby risk provoking a
wider crisis in confidence that would affect the foreign clientele of
Swiss banks generally. It would seem that the Basler Handelsbank
nearly succumbed to this temptation following the freezing of its assets
in France and the imprisonment in Paris of its two managers.45 By
making the violation of banking secrecy an offense that would be auto-
matically prosecuted, in principle, by the Swiss authorities, the 1934
law diminished this danger.
44
 Neue Lurcher Zeitung, 10 Jan. 1933.
45
 Cf. letter from the Swiss ambassador in France to the Federal Political Department, 17
Nov. 1932, FAB E 2001 (D)/l/64.
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Change of Attitude by the Federal Court Regarding
Sequestration and the Socialist Threat
Several other factors intervened in the reinforcement of banking
secrecy. In 1930, the Federal Court, the supreme Swiss legal authority,
modified its policy regarding sequestration. In order to facilitate pro-
ceedings in cases of bankruptcy, the Court decided to widen the banks'
obligation to lift banking secrecy and provide information about their
customers if a writ of sequestration were delivered to them. This deci-
sion raised grave discontent in banking circles. First the Basler Han-
delsbank, followed by the Credit Suisse, appealed to the Federal Court
against this new conception in an attempt to force a reversal of the de-
cision. In March 1932, the appeal of the Basler Handelsbank was
rejected. Several leading German newspapers jubilantly reported this
rejection under the headline "Banking Secrecy Partially Lifted in Swit-
zerland." The ruling provoked the first of several acrimonious articles
against the federal judges in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung.46
In September 1932, the appeal by the Credit Suisse was likewise
rejected. This was too much and, in December 1932, the Neue Zurcher
Zeitung published another long article sharply critical of the Federal
Court. It stressed that the "economic damage resulting from such an
attitude is evident. The new conception of the Federal Court has sev-
eral times been used abroad . . . to campaign against Swiss banks, and
certain tabloids have declared that banking secrecy has been partially
lifted in Switzerland."47
Banking circles, however, were not preoccupied by this aspect
alone. They were even more concerned that the federal judges' new
conception would facilitate what they called "foreign banking espio-
nage," or attempts by foreign fiscal authorities to obtain information on
capital that had found its way to Switzerland. It would seem that the
tax-evasion and fiscal-fraud affair uncovered in France in late October
of 1932 had nourished this fear. The French authorities did, in fact, try
to obtain information on capital deposits in Switzerland by means of
the writ of sequestration. Thus, in the case of Francois Cory and his
family, the French authorities managed to arrange for writs of seques-
tration to be delivered to no less than thirty-one Swiss banks.48
Whatever the true extent of the danger, Swiss banking circles were
46
 Reported in Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 9 April 1932; see also 8 March 1932.
47
 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 21 Dec. 1932.
48
 Cf. Otto Huber, Die Geheimtialtungspflicht des Beauftragten unter spezieller Beriick-
sichtigung des Bankgeheimnisses (Bem, 1936), 115.
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not prepared to risk it. Thus, the article in the Neue Ziircher Zeitung
quoted above strongly emphasized the fact that "the change in the
Federal Court s conception must be rejected all the more" inasmuch as
it encourages "foreign banking espionage in Switzerland"; hence "the
banks expect the Federal Court to revert to its previous interpretation.
. . ." In March 1933, the same newspaper discussed the matter at great
length once again. It declared that "Swiss banks have built themselves
an international reputation thanks to the confidence they inspire
abroad, and thanks to this confidence they administer extensive foreign
capital. This confidence is based inter alia on the fact that the State to a
large extent refrains from interfering with banking secrecy. . . ."49 The
article adds that, if the Federal Court were to maintain its new concep-
tion, i t" . . . would leave the door wide open to banking espionage.... A
foreign fiscal authority could then, directly or indirectly, easily obtain
information on its citizens' banking assets in Switzerland." The result
would be "the disruption" of the confidence placed in Swiss banks.
In these conditions, the reinforcement of banking secrecy con-
tained in the 1934 law could only lend further support and legitimacy
to the bankers' opposition to the Federal Court. The aftermath serves
as a good illustration of this point. True, the federal judges never for-
mally went back on their 1930 decision. The banks, however, taking
their stand on the 1934 law, refused to acknowledge it, thereby defying
the supreme legal authority of the country; and the latter, in the words
of a specialist writing some forty years later, " . . . would seem to have
resigned itself to the inevitable."50
Banking secrecy was further reinforced by another factor. The
Swiss workers' movement and its principal constituent, the Socialist
Party, were very hostile to banking secrecy because this practice made
any attempt by fiscal authorities to counter fiscal fraud very difficult.
Therefore, they had for years been trying to obtain the relaxation—and
even the suppression—of this practice, particularly at the end of World
War I, on the occasion of the parliamentary debates related to the re-
form of the fiscal system of the Confederation. During these debates,
49
 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 7 May 1933. It should also be noted that, in December 1933, the
law professor Robert Haab, son of the former federal councilor of the same name (member
of the Swiss government from 1917 to 1929), also insisted, in a reference to the demande de
sequestre presented by the French authorities in the case of Francois Coty, on the "regretta-
ble fact" that the new conception of the Federal Court considerably increased the possibili-
ties of "spying on the financial situation of specific persons"; Robert Haab, "Die rechtliche
Stellung des dritten Gewahrsaminhabers im Arrestverfahren," Xeitschrift des Bernischen ]u-
ristenvereins, v. 69 (Dec. 1933), 558-559.
50
 Maurice Aubert et al., he secret bancaire suisse (Bern, 1976), 128.
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the Socialists had fought vigorously for the introduction of a temporary
federal tax on income and property and, in this context, the lifting of
banking secrecy. The Socialist offensive against banking secrecy at the
time enjoyed a certain amount of support from the Swiss Farmers'
Union. In the Swiss Parliament, the Socialist representatives formed
only a small minority: 49 of 233. Nevertheless, their motion was only
defeated by a narrow margin. This can be explained by the fact that the
motion found support from a large number of agricultural representa-
tives who were members of the conservative parties.51
From the beginning of the 1930s on, renewed discussion of federal
fiscal policy was prompted by the Confederations budgetary difficul-
ties arising from the economic crisis. The question of a direct federal
income tax was once more seriously discussed, and with it the specter
of banking secrecy being lifted loomed once again. In 1932, the Social-
ist Party launched an initiative calling for a federal tax on income and
property, which collected a considerable number of signatures.52 In
October 1933, during parliamentary debates on a financial reform
project proposed by the federal authorities as an alternative to this ini-
tiative, Socialist deputies renewed their charge, calling for a clause in
this reform that would lift banking secrecy in order to counter fiscal
fraud in Switzerland. True, their demand was once again rejected, but
their spokesman issued a serious warning. "Rest assured," he declared
to the right-wing majority of the National Council, "that this is certainly
not the last time that we shall propose it. . . ,"53
It was also as a protection against such dangers, mounted, in a
certain sense, by the "enemy within," that an additional bulwark was
erected around banking secrecy. Business circles were concerned
with what was happening not only at the national but also at the
cantonal level. In the early 1930s, the workers' movement obtained
electoral gains in several cantons. This upsurge presaged the as-
sumption of power by Socialist majorities, as in fact occurred in the
canton of Geneva in the autumn of 1933. It was feared that such
majorities might enact fiscal reforms at a cantonal level, accompa-
nied by measures directed against banking secrecy.54 With the adop-
tion of the 1934 Banking Law, however, this danger was greatly di-
51
 Cf. S. Gtiex, La pohtique, 412-416.
52
 Cf. Oswald Sigg, Die eidgetwssischen Volhinitiativen 1892-1939 (Einsiedeln, 1978),
164-173.
53
 Bulletin stenographique afficiel de I'Assemblee federale-Conseil national, Bern, 4 Oct.
1933,526.
54
 Cf., for example, Journal de Geneve, 13 Oct. and 5 Dec. 1933.
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minished, as any such cantonal measures would henceforth be in
contradiction with a federal statute that, in principle, would take
precedence.
One important point concerning the representatives of the work-
ers' movement remains to be clarified. As I reported earlier, they were
hostile to the idea of banking secrecy. During the preparliamentary and
parliamentary phases of discussion on the Banking Law, however, they
kept silent and did not oppose article 47, despite its reinforcement of
the principle of banking secrecy. How is this attitude to be explained?
Could it be partly interpreted along the lines of Hugo Banziger's sur-
mise that "left-wing political parties" were anxious to "protect the
wealth of politically persecuted persons"?55 Very few convincing argu-
ments support such an hypothesis, even though one Socialist national
councilors ambiguous declaration in July 1932 could be construed in
this sense.56 In fact, a more probable explanation of this lack of reaction
can be found in the following three combined factors: First, as we have
seen, Socialist deputies had suffered a crushing defeat in their attempt
to obtain the lifting of banking secrecy in October 1933; that is to say,
only a few weeks before the beginning of the parliamentary procedure
examining the draft of the Banking Law. Their chances of changing the
course of events so soon after this failure were clearly negligible. Sec-
ond, as we have also seen, to question article 47 of this law was to in-
crease the risk of seeing the whole project crumble. Now the Socialists
were eager to see some supervision of the banks introduced as quickly
as possible. Finally, the draft version of the Banking Law raised a whole
series of questions, in addition to the supervision of the banks, which
had been at the center of the claims of the workers' movement for
years. These issues, having to do with control of the exportation of cap-
ital and monitoring the interest rate in Switzerland, therefore monopo-
lized the attention of their representatives at this stage.
Renewed Confrontation over Swiss Banking Secrecy
Law at the End of World War II
In the course of the twentieth century, the most serious challenge
to the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law took place at the end of World War
II. During the war, Switzerland maintained a neutral position on a dip-
55
 H. Banziger, Die Entwicklung, 117.
56
 Cf. Bulletin stenographique ojficiel de I'AssevilAee federate—Conseil national, Bern, 5
July 1932, 405.
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lomatic level, a claim that cannot be made for its politics in the eco-
nomic sphere. In fact, from June 1940 on, following the collapse of
France, Swiss ruling circles virtually integrated the Swiss economic and
financial apparatus within the economic sphere of the Axis powers.
Germany and Italy benefited from a certain number of favors essential
to their war effort: delivery of strategic equipment, transit through the
Alpine tunnels, supply of electricity, and, finally, financial support. In-
deed, in the financial arena, Switzerland found itself ardently solicited
during World War II. From the summer of 1940 on, the Swiss franc
presented two major advantages: on the one hand, it remained a very
strong currency, and, on the other, it was the only European currency
that was almost freely convertible during the entire course of the war.
That is why the Swiss banks were in a position to participate in a large
number of international financial transactions of all kinds. For in-
stance, they purchased considerable amounts—worth 1.2 billion
Swiss francs—of Nazi gold, and they financed—in anticipation of re-
ceiving appreciable benefits—substantial credits to the Axis powers:
1.1 billion Swiss francs to Nazi Germany and 400 million Swiss francs
to Mussolini's Italy.
The Swiss financial center could therefore maintain its strong posi-
tion despite the war. What is more, at the end of the war, it saw the
promise of excellent, not to say grandiose, prospects, thanks to differ-
ent assets: the preservation of the strength of the Swiss franc; the main-
tenance of the essential infrastructure and international networks of
the banks, financial societies, and insurance companies; very free capi-
tal and currency circulation; and, finally, a lenient taxation system com-
pared with international norms. The Swiss Bankers' Association was
perfectly aware of this promising situation; shortly after the end of the
war, it wrote in a report to the federal authorities: ". . . thanks to its in-
tact economy and the strength of its credit system, our country is one
of the few countries in Europe capable of playing an important role as
an international financial center."5' These assets would assure the Swiss
financial center that considerable amounts of foreign capital would
seek refuge in Switzerland and that its role as a "turntable" for interna-
tional capital would be reinforced. However, this capability required
one condition: the upholding of the Banking Secrecy Law, which is ex-
actly where a major problem emerged.
Their intense collaboration with Germany and Italy during the war
37
 Report of the Swiss Bankers' Association to the Federal Administration of Finance, 27
March 1946, FAB E 6100(A)/24/2.
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placed members of Swiss economic and political circles in a very delicate
situation vis-a-vis the Allied powers at the end of the world conflict. They
found themselves isolated on the international scene. Adding to their
difficulty, the Allies, in particular the United States, had formidable
means of pressure at their disposal. They were in a position to hinder
Switzerland's economic exchanges considerably, thanks notably to the
blacklists they had drawn up during the war, which included a consider-
able number of Swiss firms. Since 1941, moreover, the American govern-
ment had frozen the extensive assets held under the Swiss flag in the
United States. It had frozen not only the assets in the possession of
the Swiss National Bank and Swiss industrial or banking societies, but
also the very sizable capital administered by Swiss banks and financial
companies and deposited in the United States before or at the beginning
of the war. The amount came to a total of at least six to seven billion
Swiss francs (a sum equivalent to almost half the Swiss gross domestic
product of that time), some five billion of which were private funds ad-
ministered by Swiss banks and financial companies.
Members of the leading Swiss economic and political circles thus
considered it imperative to make certain concessions to the Allies in or-
der to ensure Switzerland's integration into the new world order. In par-
ticular, it became crucial to achieve the suppression of the blacklists and
the unfreezing of Swiss assets in the United States.58 In this respect, be-
sides the payment of a type of "fine," finally fixed at 250 million Swiss
francs by the Washington Agreement, the Allies made two main de-
mands of the Swiss authorities: First, a detailed inventory of all German
assets, either in Switzerland or controlled by Swiss firms elsewhere, and
their expropriation, in order to guard against the danger of the reconsti-
tution of the Nazi war potential. Second, the precise identification of all
private assets emanating from Switzerland and frozen in the United
States. In both cases, the Allies demanded a very thorough investigative
procedure, to be closely supervised by their own officials, which would
enable them to establish not only the exact amount and the national ori-
gin of such assets but also the names of their effective owners.59
58
 On this problem, ef. esp. Marc Perrenoud, "Banques et diplomatic suisses a la fin de la
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Such claims amounted to demanding the virtual'lifting of the Swiss
Banking Secrecy Law in favor of the Allies. In other words, the most
serious threat to banking secrecy occurred at the moment when, as
noted above, the Swiss financial center saw a future filled with excel-
lent prospects. Banking secrecy thus became a central issue in Swiss
national and international policy at the end of the war.
One factor reveals the importance attached to this question by
Swiss ruling circles. As soon as the power struggle on the battlefield
shifted in favor of the Allies, they perceived with considerable insight
the implicit dangers in this shift for Swiss banking secrecy and started
to plan accordingly. Thus, as early as the beginning of June 1943, even
before the Allies had landed in Italy, the problem of the future un-
freezing of assets in the United States was mentioned at a conference
between the Swiss Bankers' Association and some senior Swiss federal
officials. On this occasion, the Swiss ambassador to the United States
declared that "after the war . . . the Americans . . . want to proceed to
the identification of the various owners of the frozen assets"; to which
the president of the Union Bank of Switzerland replied that for Swiss
institutions to accept such identification "would ruin the entire private
banking business."60 A few days later, it was the turn of the National
Bank to express its misgivings: ". . . the American authorities," it wrote
to the Federal Political Department,
which seem to be so scandalized by Swiss banking secrecy, might
well require its progressive dismantling and demand, before the
cancellation of any freezing measures, details of the names . . . of
the effective owners of the assets deposited in the United States
under the banks' names. . . . It therefore seems appropriate to
examine now rather than later how best to defend the Swiss point
of view in due course.61
The strategy deployed by Swiss economic and political circles in
defending banking secrecy developed in two directions. First, on the
"internal front," the aim was to avoid a conjunction and mutual rein-
forcement of the criticisms and adverse measures emanating from
abroad and those being deployed on the home front. In this respect, a
disturbing signal had been given in June 1942, when almost all the So-
cialist deputies of the National Council had signed a motion calling on
60
 Memorandum from Willi Reichenau of the Federal Political Department, 7 June 1943,
FAB E 2001 (E)/2/563.
61
 Letter from the Swiss National Bank to the Federal Political Department, 16 June
1943, FAB E 2001 (E)/2/563.
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"the Federal Council . . . to table shortly a proposal to the Chambers
for the lifting of banking secrecy . . ,"62 Although this motion had been
rejected during the debate in September 1943, it had nevertheless won
the votes of a considerable number of non-Socialist deputies. Another
disturbing sign was the significant electoral success of the Socialist
Party in the federal elections of October 1943.
In this context, in December 1943, the right-wing majority of Par-
liament for the first time elected a representative of the Socialist Party
to join the Swiss government, at the same time appointing him head of
the Federal Department of Finance. True, this election was the conse-
quence of considerations other than those described here. The fact
remains, however, that, in the context of the issue of banking secrecy,
this election was one of extreme efficacy. In Switzerland, the govern-
ment is formed by seven ministers who are elected by Parliament and
represent the major parties. However, the government functions as a
collegial institution: that is, once a decision has been made, each minis-
ter has to assume it, even if he does not agree with it and his party has
adopted a contrary resolution. Therefore, the newly appointed Social-
ist, placed at the head of the Ministry of Finance, was in the position of
having to defend the Swiss financial center and Swiss banking secrecy
against the criticisms and demands of the Allies because this was the
orientation of the Federal Council. He even carried out this assign-
ment with diligence. In June 1945, at one of the many hearings granted
to the Swiss Bankers' Association, he actually declared that "on several
occasions he had already made a point of drawing the Federal Coun-
cil's attention" to the fact that the U.S. government's policy regarding
Swiss banks "is strongly inspired by Wall Street, that is to say by com-
petitive motives that Switzerland cannot afford to ignore. The Federal
Council is aware of the danger and it is its duty not to abandon the
banks but rather to support them."63 The ambivalent situation in which
the Socialist Party found itself thus contributed to its neutralization.
Henceforward, any step it might take in the direction of questioning
banking secrecy would contradict the public position of its represent-
ative in the government. This explains why, paradoxically, the Social-
Democratic Left remained very discreet on this question at the end of
World War II.
Once free from concern about the threat from within, Swiss ruling
circles turned their attention to the external danger. To do this, they
62
 Resume des deliberations de I'Assemblee federate, Bern, no. 4, 1943, 13.
63
 Quoted in Sebastien Guex/Marc Perrenoud, "Banquiers suisses et autorites federates
face aux menaces americaines en 1945," Traverse. Revue d'Histoire, no. 3, 1995, 136.
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embarked on a policy that astutely combined three main components.
In the first place, they adopted a number of delaying tactics, constantly
demanding thorough legal valuations and systematically raising new
technical problems. For example, in an agreement signed in March
1945 with the Allied powers, which dealt with the question of the cen-
sus of the German assets in Switzerland and their expropriation, the
Swiss authorities committed themselves to se concerter with the gov-
ernments of several countries before taking a certain number of mea-
sures.64 In French, the verb se concerter implies that the foreign gov-
ernment must agree with the measure. The English translation of the
agreement, however, used the expression to consult with, which is
more ambiguous. There were endless discussions on whether the Swiss
governments commitment was to inform the other country or whether
it needed to obtain its permission.
Another example can be found in the same agreement, where the
Swiss authorities also committed themselves to carry out an accurate
investigation on the amount of foreign assets either in Switzerland or
administered by Swiss societies. Later on, however, all kinds of techni-
cal and legal excuses were given in order to delay the accomplishment
of these investigations.65 These tactics allowed the Swiss ruling circles
to conduct most of their discussions with the Allies in a climate increas-
ingly colored by the Cold War. For instance, the most important nego-
tiations between Switzerland and the Western Allied powers started on
March 18, 1946, two weeks after the resounding speech of Churchill at
Fulton, denouncing the "Iron Curtain" that had fallen in the East.
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that during the same discussions in
Washington one of the Swiss negotiators pointed out, in an internal
meeting of the Swiss delegation, that "with time, the situation can only
improve for us," and another negotiator stated that "the times to come
won't be unfavorable for us."66
Second, the Swiss authorities had recourse to a financial weapon.
In March 1945, they granted France, at very favorable conditions for
the debtor, a credit of 250 million Swiss francs (the equivalent of about
2 percent of the Swiss gross domestic product at the time). A year later,
acting in parallel to the negotiations with the Western Allies in Wash-
64
 Quoted in P. Marguerat/L.-E. Roulet, eds., Documents diplomatiques suisses, v. 15
(Bem, 1992), 986.
65
 Cf. M. Durrer, Die schweizerisch-arnerikanischen, 244-246; Janick Schaufelbuhl, "Das
Bankgeheimnis im Konflikt zwischen der Schweiz und Frankreich. Die Deblockierung der
franzosischen Guthaben in der Schweiz, 1945-1948," Traverse. Revue d'Histoire, no. 2, 1999,
216-218.
66
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ington, they raised the credit to 300 million francs. Almost at the same
time, on March 12, 1946, a week before the beginning of the negotia-
tions in Washington, Great Britain was granted a loan of 260 million
francs, also at very favorable conditions for the debtor. The primary ob-
jective of these important loans was to persuade the French and the
English to be more accommodating and thus to weaken the coalition
of the Western Allies. When explaining, in December 1945, the wish of
the Federal Council to grant Great Britain a credit, the Swiss ambassa-
dor in London wrote that it was a question of "ensuring the indulgence
of the English government... in view of the negotiations with the Al-
lies."67 As for the loan granted to France, a high-ranking Swiss official
justified it in April 1946, shortly after the beginning of the discussions
in Washington, as necessary to avoid "upsetting the French . . . in view
of our extremely difficult negotiations in Washington. . . . We need
France politically."68 The loans fulfilled their objective. As the historian
Linus von Castlemur has shown, they ensured the adoption by the
British and French of a more favorable attitude toward the Swiss than
that held by the Americans during the entire period of negotiations.69
Finally, Swiss ruling circles successfully mobilized Switzerland's
"humanitarian capital," with the result that the Swiss government was
thanked on several occasions for its humanitarian policies, notably by
the president of the United States and the British prime minister,
which helped in some measure to restore the country's international
reputation.70 Toward the end of the war, the Swiss authorities slowly at-
tenuated the extremely harsh nature of the policies that they had, up to
that point, adopted toward refugees and, more generally, toward vic-
tims of the conflict. Several tens of thousands of refugees or former in-
ternees in concentration camps could now enter Switzerland, thou-
sands of children coming from France were welcomed for short stays,
and an effort was made to assist the repatriation of prisoners of war.
The motives for these initiatives are clearly described in the letter writ-
ten by the Swiss foreign minister, Max Petitpierre, on April 9, 1945, to
his colleagues in the Federal Council: "Our country does not only have
a humanitarian act to fulfill but also a political problem to solve. If we
67
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69
 Cf. L. von Castelmur, Schweizerisch-alliierte, 49-89, 123-157.
70
 Cf. Walter Spahni, Der Ausbruch der Schweiz aus der Isolation nach dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg (Frauenfeld, 1977), 131-133; Jean-Claude Favez, "Le Don suisse et la politique
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contribute to save an appreciable number of miserable people, we will
have a crucial argument to justify our neutrality which, as you know, is
attacked by most of the Allied countries, especially by the United
States and France."71
In the autumn of 1944, Swiss authorities founded an institution,
the Don suisse pour les victimes de la guerre (Swiss Donation for Vic-
tims of War), endowed with about 200 million francs that were derived
partly from a collection taken up in the Swiss population. The Don
suisse soon carried out rescue operations—distribution of food, clothes,
and material—in several foreign countries. Again, the objectives of this
institution seem clear. In fact, the deputy, Adolfo Janner, one of the
persons very much in favor of the Don suisse, declared: "It will not be
the Washington Agreement or our negotiations that will attract the
sympathy and gratitude of the people and nations . . ., but it will be
solely the humble and generous humanitarian act of our people that. . .
will guarantee our country its place of honor and prestige in the new
entente of nations."72 More soberly, in a letter addressed to the Federal
Council, the management of the Don suisse wrote that its activities
represented for Switzerland "the best way to leave the isolation in
which it finds itself because of the war."73
This policy bore fruit for the Swiss authorities, who, on the basis of
the Washington Agreement signed on May 25, 1946—which was com-
pleted by the signing, on November 22, 1946, of the "Certification
Agreement"—succeeded in prevailing on the Allies to suppress the
blacklists and to unfreeze assets blocked in the United States without
being required to undertake any appreciable weakening of banking
secrecy.
Regarding that issue, however, the Swiss negotiators admittedly
had to give way on one point: their demand that German assets in Swit-
zerland, or administered by Swiss companies, be recorded and then ex-
propriated through an anonymous procedure. In this case, the Swiss
had to commit themselves to lift banking secrecy in favor of the Allies
and accept that the names of the holders of these assets would, as a
rule, be communicated to the Allies.
However, in Swiss political and economic circles, this was not con-
sidered to be the most crucial aspect. In their view, the essential chal-
71
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lenge was to preserve the anonymity, vis-a-vis the Allies, of the remain-
ing foreign clientele of Swiss banking establishments, particularly—
once again—of their French depositors.74 One can better measure the
importance of this stake by the fact that, of the private assets of some 5
billion Swiss francs administered under the Swiss flag and blocked in
the United States, the sum of roughly 2 billion Swiss francs (about the
equivalent of 150 billion French francs today) belonged to French de-
positors alone.75 Had the procedure of unfreezing these assets first per-
mitted the Allies to discover the names of the actual holders of these
assets, the names would ultimately have reached the French fiscal au-
thorities. Admittedly, the owners concerned would have been able to
lift the block on their frozen assets. However, by dint of French laws,
they would then have been forced to repatriate their capital to France,
where they would have been exposed to heavy taxation or even to pros-
ecution for fiscal fraud. Worse still, they would have found themselves
under the spotlight of the French fiscal authorities for the future.
However, the Swiss ruling circles succeeded in warding off the Al-
lied powers' demands. First, the procedure for identifying the German
assets in Switzerland, as well as the frozen Swiss assets in the United
States was not carried out either by Allied civil servants or under their
direct supervision. It was entrusted to a semi-state-run Swiss institu-
tion, the Office suisse de compensation (Swiss Compensation Office).76
The Swiss preference for the Swiss Compensation Office can be ex-
plained by two factors: In terms of external politics, it seemed wise to
avoid assigning to an entirely state-run institution the responsibility for
such a delicate operation. As for internal politics, the decision to en-
trust an organization that was only partially state administered limited
the danger that tax information would be leaked to other administra-
tive departments. For good measure, the Swiss Compensation Office
delegated a substantial part of its powers to the Swiss banks themselves
'* Although this was the main stake at issue, there were, in fact, others. For example, the
possibility of unfreezing assets administered by Swiss establishments in the United States
without having to deliver the names of their real owners to the Allies—with the exception of
German owners—allowed these assets to avoid American taxation. Cf. letter from Joseph
Straessle, financial councilor of the Swiss Legation in Washington to the Foreign Affairs Divi-
sion of the Federal Political Department, 12 Dec. 1944, FAB E 7160-02/1968/27/9.
75
 Cf. the final report of the Swiss Compensation Office on the certification of Swiss assets
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"Accusations in the Matter of the Certification of 'Swiss Assets' Frozen in the USA," signed
by Paul Cany, professor of law at the University of Geneva and member of the Committee of
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in order to maintain international trust in the Swiss banks' ability to
regulate and supervise themselves. In this context, the Allied authori-
ties were able to exercise only indirect, relatively remote surveillance,
which considerably restricted their ability to obtain information on
Swiss banks and their clientele.
Second, apart from assets belonging to German citizens, the Swiss
authorities were not obliged to transmit the names of the actual owners
of other assets controlled by Swiss banking establishments to the Allies.
Thus, most of the foreign clientele of Swiss banking establishments,
particularly French investors, were able to preserve their anonymity."
Secrecy laws were therefore maintained in the face of the World
War II victors, most notably the United States, which was the leading
world power. The victory succeeded in conferring on Swiss banking se-
crecy the reputation of inviolability that still subsists today. In this way,
it has contributed to cementing a lasting sense of trust between foreign
depositors and the Swiss financial center.
Today banking secrecy remains a highly controversial practice,
both in Switzerland and internationally. First, banking secrecy is criti-
cized because it provides shelter to numerous dubious or illegal inter-
national deals and, most recently, because of the publicity over Jewish
accounts during and after World War II. Among those who have
profited from the practice during the last ten years are the dictators
General Sese Seko Mobutu from Zaire and General Sani Abacha
from Nigeria, who deposited a large part of the fortune they looted
from their respective countries in Swiss bank accounts.'8 Second, the
European Union challenges the Swiss practice because it is now en-
gaged, very timidly it is true, in unifying its tax system and is working
to eliminate some existing tax loopholes. Of course the Union wants
to avoid losing large amounts of its citizens' capital to banking havens
in Switzerland.'9
In the criticism of banking secrecy, the issue of its origins plays a
certain role. In fact, since the late 1960s, Swiss banks disseminated the
idea that the Banking Secrecy Law was introduced in order to protect
the victims of Nazi persecution. This version was even incorporated
into a report by the Federal Council, thereby lending it official respect-
'
:
 On this point, cf. esp. the document entitled "Fraude de certification. Fribourg. Rap-
port de cloture. Partie generale, du Juge d'instmction federal pour la Suisse romande," 19
April 1951, 1-28, FAB E 7160-01/1968/223/324.
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ability.80 These propaganda efforts helped to confer additional legiti-
macy to banking secrecy, as manifested in the fact that almost all
studies on the issue during the last decades reproduced the Councils
version without hesitation. I hope this article has helped to clear up the
confusion.
80
 Cf. Message du Conseil federal a l'Assemblee federale concernant la revision de la loi
sur les banques, 13 March 1970, Feuille federale 1970, v. 1 (Bern), 1175.
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